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firming the action of the trial court, the Supreme Court said,
inter alia,
"It is not our intention to hold that the peaceful picketing
of which the employer complains in the instant case falls
within the prohibition or protection of the Taft-Hartley Act,
for we recognize that primary jurisdiction to determine these
questions rests with the National Labor Relations Board, and
not with the state court."' 6
Adopting the rationale of the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,' 7 the Louisiana court
reasoned that the Board's dismissal of a charge of union violation of Section 8(b) (4) was not dispositive of the inquiry
whether other sections of the act may not have been violated by
the union, and, in any case, it was wholly inconclusive of the
issue whether the union's activity constituted a right protected
by the act. All of these inquiries are properly referred to the
Board and outside the state court's jurisdiction. The decision
seems entirely correct and the court appears to have a complete
appreciation of this most difficult problem of federalism - or
jurisdictional tidelands of labor relations, as it has aptly been
called.
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Dale E. Bennett*
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COMPLIANCE WITH READING REQUIREMENTS

In Doll v. New Orleans' the Supreme Court invalidated a
1954 act of the Louisiana Legislature 2 on the ground that it had
not been read on three different days as required by Article III,
Section 24, of the Louisiana Constitution. The Constitution does
not require that compliance with this provision be shown by a
Journalentry. If the Journalsare silent as to compliance or noncompliance with this type of constitutional requirement, the
courts conclusively presume that the constitutional mandate has
15. 229 La. 37, 85 So.2d 22 (1956).
16. 229 La. 37, 50, 85 So.2d 22, 27 (1956).
17. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 229 La. 277, 85 So.2d 514 (1956), 17 LoUISIANA LAW REvIEw ... (1956).
2. La. Acts 1954, no. 536, p. 1001, incorporated as LA. R.S. 47:2190 (1950).
3. LA. CONST. Art. III, §24: "Every bill shall be read on three different days
ineach house ...."
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been followed. 4 However, if the Journals affirmatively show
either compliance or non-compliance with the Constitution they
are conclusive proof as to the legislative proceedings. 5 In this
case, since the Senate Journal clearly showed that the bill had
been read on only two different days,6 the court was correct in
invalidating the act. It should be noted that the opinion failed
to indicate that the invalidating infirmity was proved by a Journal entry. This is important, because if the Journal had not reflected the error in the legislative process, the Supreme Court
would have conclusively presumed compliance with the constitutional reading requirements. 7
CONSTRUCTION OF PROVISIONS OF REVISED STATUTES IN
PARI MATERIA
The common law and civil law rule that statutes in pari
materia are to be construed together applies to laws "upon the
same subject matter,"'8 and is most effective as to laws passed at
the same session of the Legislature. 9 This last element is clearly
met by the revised statutes. As Chief Justice Fournet stated in
Fudickarv. Heard-"the Revised Statutes constitute a single act
of the Legislature, adopted as a whole; different sections should
be regarded not as separate acts, but as simultaneous expressions
of the legislative will, and all provisions should be construed
together and reconciled whenever possible." 10 It should be noted,
however, that the Revised Statutes cover a wide variety of subjects, sometimes quite unrelated. In these situations the legislative purposes will be defeated, rather than achieved, by an attempt to carry over definitions and policies from one area of the
law to another. It is only where the provisions deal with a common subject matter that they are to be treated as in parimateria
and construed together.
The problem is graphically presented by State v. Viator n
where the Supreme Court construed the crime of unlawful sale
4. Wall v. Close, 203 La. 345, 14 So.2d 19 (1943) ; State v. Bauman,
743, 87 So. 732 (1921).
5. Bethlehem Supply Co. v. Pan-Southern Petroleum Corp., 207 La.
So.2d 737 (1945) ; State em rel. Porterie v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72
6. Louisiana Senate Journal, 1690, 1692, 1875, 1876 (17th Regular

1954).

148 La.
149, 20
(1936).
Session

7. Note 4 supra.
8. LA. CIVIL CODE Art. 17 (1870) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
J 5201 (1943).
9. Sutherland, supra, § 5202.
10. 223 La. 127, 134, 65 So.2d 112, 114 (1953).
11. 229 La. 882, 87 So.2d 115 (1956).
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of "intoxicating or spirituous liquors" to minors, so as to exclude
the sale of beer. This limitation of the crime of unlawful sales to
minors, found in the Criminal Law Title of the Revised Statutes, 12 was achieved by applying a definition of "liquor" found
in the Liquor-Alcoholic Beverage Title, 18 which treats of alcoholic beverage controls and licensing. "Liquor" was therein defined as "any distilled or rectified alcoholic beverage," as distinguished from fermented beverages such as beer and wine. It
is significant that this definition is one of several that are specially provided for purposes of the alcoholic beverage control
chapter wherein it is found.' 4 The crime of unlawful sales to
minors, as defined in the Criminal Code, might well employ the
term "intoxicating liquors" in a much broader sense than they
were used in the licensing and taxing provisions of Title 26,
where a distinction between beverages of high and low alcoholic
content has been established.
As dissenting Justice Hawthorne pointed out, the phrase "intoxicating liquor" is used in other Criminal Code articles and in
several titles of the Revised Statutes. Whether the provision
d als with driving a vehicle while "under the influence of intoxict ting liquor,"'15 or with the sale of "intoxicating liquors in close
pi oximity to a polling place on election day,"' 6 it may be assumed
tl at the common or popular meaning is intended, rather than the
s mewhat artificial and limited meaning provided for Title 26.
I he generally accepted meaning, until the Viactor decision, had
been that the beverage must be capable of producing intoxication,
regardless of whether it is distilled or fermented. This popular
construction of the phrase, over a long period of time, should be
17
"highly significant" as to its true meaning.
However, the judicial interpretation of "intoxicating liquor"
is now fixed by the Viator decision. As a result, new statutes intending to stress the intoxicating effect, rather than the nature
of the beverage, must steer clear of the limiting term "liquor" in
favor of the more embracive term "beverage." For example, a
1956 statute amended Article 98 of the Criminal Code so as to
12. LA. R.S. 14:91 (1950).
13. LA. R.S. 26:2(2) (1950).
14. LA. R.S. 26:2 (1950) : "Definitions. For the purpose of this Chapter, the
following terms have the respective meanings ascribed to them in this Section ......
15. LA. R.S. 14:98 (1950).
16. LA. R.S. 18:333, 366, 367 (1950).
17. United States v. Farrar, 38 F.2d 515 (D. Mass. 1930); SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5107 (1943).

19571

PUBLIC LAW

define drunken driving as the operation of a vehicle while under
the influence of "intoxicating beverages or narcotic drugs."' 18
SECTION HEADINGS OF THE REVISED STATUTES
Where section headings are enacted as part of a law they
have been frequently construed as limiting the scope of the section to which they are appended. 19 In order to avoid this construction as to the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, Section
1:13 expressly declares that the section headings "are given for
the purpose of convenient reference and do not constitute part of
the law."
In State v. Democratic State Central Committee" a question
is raised as to what judicial recognition is to be afforded the section headings in the revised statutes. The principal issue in that
case was whether the State Central Committee was required to
call a second primary for lesser state officers where the candidate for Governor had received a majority of the votes cast in
the first primary. R.S. 18:356 (Second Primary for Governor
and Other State Officers) was construed by the court as not providing for a second primary for lesser state officers if the candidate for Governor received a majority of the votes cast. A
further question had been raised as to whether R.S. 18:358 (Second Primary for Local Offices) could be the basis of a second
primary for lesser state officers in the state-wide election. Here
again the Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners in their
request for the calling of a second primary, holding that Section
358 applied solely and exclusively to second primaries for local
offices. A question as to the effect of the section headings of the
revised statutes is raised by the fact that Justice Simon, writing
for a unanimous court, declared that the 1950 Revised Statutes
"clearly indicates that section 18:358 by its very caption, carried
in heavy black type, applies only to second primaries for local
offices, and that section 18:356 by its like pronounced caption
applies solely and exclusively to a second primary for governor
and other state officers. ' 21 "Conceding for the moment" petitioner's argument that the caption formed no part of the statute,
18. La. Act 122 of 1956, discussed in Bennett, Legislation Alfecting Criminal
Law and Procedure, 17 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEw 52, 54 (1956).
19. Carter v. Liquid Carbonic Pacific Corp., 97 F.2d 1, (9th Cir. 1938), where
"carbonated beverages" was limited to "soft drinks"; 'People v. Molyneux, 40 N.Y.
113 (1869) ; Barnes v. Jones, 51 Cal. 303 (1876).
20. 229 La. 556, 569-71, 86 So.2d 192, 196-97 (1956).
21. Id. at 569, 86 So.2d at 196.
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Justice Simon declared that the captions preceding these sections
"made crystal clear the particular applicability thereof. ' 22
If the section headings were used by Justice Simon to bolster
a construction placed upon the actual language of R.S. 18:358,
it would appear that they were appropriately cited. Resort may
be had to such sources of legislative intent, either as a makeweight argument or to resolve ambiguities. However, the section
heading could not appropriately be used to place a restriction
upon Section 358 which was inconsistent with the plain meaning
of the language of that section. Such a use would be in violation
of the specific provision in the Revised Statutes that the section
headings "are given for purpose of convenient reference and do
not constitute part of the law."
The primary purpose of section headings is to provide a quick
index to the contents of the various sections. They may also be
used to provide the revisor's version as to the nature and scope
of the section. They may not be used to restrict, extend, or contradict the language of a section. It would appear entirely appropriate that where subsequently enacted statutes are given section headings by their draftsmen, and become part of the revised
statutes, it is contemplated that the section headings shall have
the same limited effect that is provided for the original section
headings in the Revised Statutes of 1950. Where no section headings are provided in a new statute, and the section headings are
inserted by the Louisiana State Law Institute as a part of the
continuous revision process, 28 the section headings would then
only serve the purpose of a convenient reference and could not be
logically construed as a proper indication of legislative intent.
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL DIGESTS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

One of the important functions performed by the Louisiana
Legislative Council is the preparation of digests of "all bills introduced, indicating the change each will make in existing law
if adopted. '24 These digests are appended to the original and
printed copies of the bills. They are generally regarded, both
when the bills are considered in committee and when they are up
for final passage, as an accurate resum6 of the nature, scope, and
effect of the bill. It may well be that these digests will provide
22. Ibid., 86 So.2d at 197.
23. LA. R.S. 24:253(8) (1950).
24. A MANUAL FOB LOUISIANA LEGISLATORS 5 (1955).
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an extrinsic source for ascertaining the basic purpose and nature
of the statute. Louisiana, as is the case in most states, does not
have a legislative record of the committee hearings and floor
debates, and so our courts must rely heavily on artificial canons
of construction, such as the doctrines of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, ejusdem generis, and noscitur a sociis. These
maxims are merely guides to interpretation, giving way to the
overriding general legislative purpose if such purpose can be
ascertained. 25 Sometimes the general legislative purpose is ascertainable from the title of the act or a policy section. More often,
such guides to statutory interpretation are unavailable or are
very inadequate. The Council Digests in Louisiana will not provide the sponsor's version of the law, often available from the
congressional records as to federal statutes. 26 However, they
should be entitled to considerable weight in ascertaining the
nebulous "legislative intent," which is the composite purpose of
the committees that reported the bill favorably and of the legislative body that gave it vitality by final passage. The Legislative
Council Digests were considered by these groups and may reasonably be presumed to represent their understanding as to the
general nature and scope of the enactment. The availability of
this interpretative material, and its weight, may well depend
upon whether an official depository of these digests is available,
either in the Office of the Secretary of State or of the Legislative Council itself.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT-

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Alvin B. Rubin*
ZONING
An attack upon the validity of an application of the New
Orleans zoning ordinance was made in New Orleans v. La Nasa.1
25. City of Shreveport v. Price, 142 La. 936, 77 So. 883 (1918), refusing to
apply the doctrine of expresaio uniu8; Boardman v. State, 203 Wis. 173, 233 N.W.
556 (1930), holding that these maxims of construction "are servants, rather than
masters, of the court."
26. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951)
where the Court looked to the statements of the bill's sponsor, Senator Tydings,
as to the purpose of the Miller-Tydings amendment to the Sherman Act.
*Member, Baton Rouge Bar, Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana
State University.

1. 230 La. 289, 88 So.2d 224 (1956).

